Observations during MPSe Testing

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Slide #2

→ GENERAL BEHAVIORS

- ♦ HALON 1301 BENCHMARKS OVER TIME
- ♦ INSTABILITIES AT LOW VENTILATION
- ♦ LARGEST EQUIVALENT VS. PEAK INERTING CONCENTRATIONS

→ DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIORS

→ FLAME ATTACHMENT BEHAVIORS


GENERAL BEHAVIORS

GENERAL BEHAVIORS – H1301 BENCHMARKS OVER TIME

- → H1301 BENCHMARKS HAVE BEEN CATALOGUED OVER TIME FOR THE VARIOUS TESTING CYCLES
- → THE BENCHMARKS SHOW DISTINCT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE FIRE THREATS IN THE TEST FIXTURE
- → THE BENCHMARKS INDICATE RELIABILITY IN THE WORK BETWEEN 2003 – 2006
- → THIS WORK SPANS THE AGENTS OF CF3I, FK 5-1-12, & HFC-125

→ THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE BENCHMARKS ALLUDES TO INSTABILITIES FOUND DURING THIS WORK

GENERAL BEHAVIORS – H1301 BENCHMARKS OVER TIME



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
- → 3 SLIDES FOLLOW; MASS EQUIVALENCE RESULTS FOR CF3I, FK 5-1-12, & HFC-125
- → IN SOME INSTANCES, STANDARD DEVIATIONS ARE "LARGE"
 - ♦ TYPICALLY THESE ARE LOW VENTILATION, POOL
 - SCATTER SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH THAT CF3I WAS NOT EVALUATED FOR LOW VENTILATION/POOL
 - > \$45/LB * 5? LB/TEST * 12 TESTS VS. 0.3 RTD_ave $<\sigma<0.5$ RTD_ave
 - SUSPECT "LARGE" AGENT MASS INJECTED INTO "WEAK" VENTILATION REGIME PRODUCES THE INSTABILITY
 - "LOW" ENERGY VENTILATION VS. "HIGH" ENERGY AGENT INJECTION
- → SIDE NOTE : BRACKETING BECOMES A VALUABLE TOOL TO FIND MASS EQUIVALENCE
 - THROUGHOUT PROJECT, QUESTIONED "HOW MUCH WAS TOO MUCH?"; i.e. TOO SUCCESSFUL...
 - CONSIDER (1) THE BEHAVIOR OF THE EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATION CALCULATION & (2) ECONOMICS OF CARRYING EXTRA AGENT AROUND FOR THE AIRCRAFT'S LIFE SPAN

Slide #7 GENERAL BEHAVIORS - MASS EQUIVALENCE, CF3I ◆ JP8 Pool, High Ventilation 14.0 ▲ JP8 Spray, High Ventilation • OIL Spray, High Ventilation 12.0 ♦ JP8 Pool, Low Ventilation Δ JP8 Spray, Low Ventilation 10.0 **OOIL Spray**, Low Ventilation 8.0 ChartCF3I 6.0 pr06a26.xls, 4.0Sec) 2.0 Q 0.0Parameter (CF3I)

Standard Standard H1301 Average RTD Average RTD Standard Benchmark Deficient Deviation Deviation Deviation Success Deficient H1301 (sec) (sec) (sec) Success (sec) (sec) (sec)

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GENERAL BEHAVIORS – MASS EQUIVALENCE, FK 5-1-12




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GENERAL BEHAVIORS – MASS EQUIVALENCE, HFC-125




Standard Standard H1301 Average RTD Average RTD Standard Benchmark Deficient Deviation Deviation Deviation Success Deficient H1301 (sec) (sec) (sec) Success (sec) (sec) (sec)

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- → THE LARGEST EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATIONS ARE COLLECTED AND COMPARED TO SOME REPORTED PEAK INERTING CONCENTRATIONS
- → USING PEAK INERTING VALUES GIVEN IT IS A WORST-CASE COMBUSTION MODEL (PREMIXED GASEOUS)
- → COMPARISON IS FAVORABLE
- → FK 5-1-12 DOES NOT EXCEED PEAK INERTING VALUES
 - ♦ PER NFPA A.5.4.2, n-HEPTANE CUP BURNER RESULTS IN 4.5% v/v
 - LARGEST EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATION SITS BETWEEN THE 2 COMBUSTION MODELS
 - ♦ WHY?
 - ★ AGENT DISCHARGE DURATION DID NOT MATCH H1301 (HFC-125 & CF3I SIMILAR) ?
 - ★ NATURE OF THE AGENT (NOTE THE DIFFERENCE IN INERTING VALUES BETWEEN HFC-125 & FK 5-1-12) ?

GENERAL BEHAVIORS – CONCENTRATION COMPARISON




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DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIORS

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DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIOR - OVERVIEW


- → DURING TESTING IN SEPTEMBER 2004 ANOMOLOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOTED IN THE TEST FIXTURE
- → BEHAVIOR CHARACTERIZED AS AN OVER-PRESSURE AT AN ATMOSPHERIC GAP IN THE FIXTURE
- → WORST-CASE EXAMPLE RESULTED IN FIREBALL & AUDIBLE SIGNATURE
- → NO TELEMETRY ORIGINALLY LOCATED IN REGION OF INTEREST
- → TEST FIXTURE WAS MODIFIED TO COLLECT DATA FROM THE AREA IN 2005; USED FOR ALL SUBSEQUENT TESTING



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DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIOR, PERTINENT TEST FIXTURE GEOMETRY

Slide #15



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→ ADDED 4 THERMOCOUPLES IN RED DUCT


- ♦ ALL ALONG 12:00
- ♦ STARTED 2 FEET IN FROM INLET, PLACED EVERY 2 FEET
- ♦ BEADS ARE 8 INCHES OFF WALL

→ ADDED 2 STATIC PRESSURE MEASUREMENT LOCATIONS

- ♦ 0-5" H2O PSID (REFERENCE TO TEST BAY)
- ♦ 1 POINT IN TEST SECTION, 03:00, STA 522
- ♦ 1 POINT IN RED DUCT SECTION, 04:30, 21 INCHES IN FROM INLET
- USING STATIC PORTS OFF 1/8"OD PITOT-STATIC TUBES INSERTED INTO FLOW FIELD

- → ADDED 4 OPTO-ELECTRONIC DEVICES TO DETECT FLAME PROPRAGATION THROUGH TEST FIXTURE
 - ♦ PHOTODIODE PHOTOCONDUCTIVE CIRCUITS
 - SENSOR VALUES
 - + \approx 0 VDC, DARK/NO FIRE
 - + ≈ 6.1 VDC, SATURATES WHEN VIEWING FLAMES OF TEST FIRE
 - ♦ 1 VIEWS TUBE ARRAY IN FIRE ZONE
 - REMAINING 3 LOOK AT 12:00
 - + ENTRANCE TO EXHAUST NOZZLE
 - ✦ EXIT OF EXHAUST NOZZLE
 - ✦ RED DUCT
- → A BOX CAN BE MOUNTED WHICH CLOSES OUT THE DUCT INTERFACE COMPLETELY
 - ALTERS STATIC PRESSURE PROFILES IN RED EXHAUST DUCT AND TEST SECTION
 - MINIMIZE CHANGE IN STATIC PRESSURE BY OPENING LOUVERS IN RED DUCT


DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIOR, NEW TELEMETRY LOCATIONS AND STRUCTURE CHANGES



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DUCT INTERFACE BEHAVIOR, OBSERVATIONS



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- → SEPTEMBER, 2004 / 2-BROMOTRIFLUOROPROPENE
 - <u>FIRE</u> & SMOKE ISSUE FROM INTERFACE ALONG WITH THE OCCASIONAL AUDIBLE CUE
 - ♦ SUBSEQUENTLY ADD TELEMETRY
- → HFC-125 / DECEMBER, 2005
 - ESTABLISHED 17.5% FOR 0.5 SECOND (5.8 LBM) FOR LOW VENTILATION
 - ♦ RUN TESTS AT 50, 75, 100, & 125% EQUIVALENCE
 - ♦ 2 OF 17 TESTS PUSH SMOKE INTO TEST BAY; NO FIRE

→ CF3I / AUGUST & SEPTEMBER 2006

- REVIEWED BEHAVIORS DURING COMPLETION OF JP8 LOW VENTILATION SPRAY AND HIGH VENTILATION POOL FIRE WORK
- NOTABLE SMOKE OBSERVED TO PUSH INTO TO TEST BAY DURING LOW VENTILATION WORK; NO FIRE

→ MARCH - JULY 2006, FK 5-1-12

- SMOKE OBSERVED TO PUSH INTO TEST BAY; NO FIRE
- ♦ MOST PREVALENT AT LOW VENTILATION
- CLOSED DUCT INTERFACE (OPENED LOUVERS IN RED DUCT)
 - ★ 100 IN^2 VENT AREA IN THE ENCLOSING BOX BOUNDARY
 - ✦ VENT AREA COVERED BY 0.001 IN THICK ALUMINUM FOIL
 - + DELIVERED MASS EQUIVALENTS TO SPRAY FIRE THREATS
 - ✦ FOIL REMAINED INTACT; OVER-PRESSURES DID NOT DEFEAT THE SEALS

→ CONCLUSIONS

- ♦ FIXTURE PROVIDES ENVIRONMENT FOR CANDIDATES TO OVER-PRESSURE BY LESS THAN P = 0.5 IN H20 (WHY NOT H1301??)
- ♦ FK 5-1-12 DID NOT BURST 0.001 INCH TIN FOIL SHEET IN THE BLOW-OUT PANELS WITH THE DUCT INTERFACE CLOSED OFF
- SMOKE EXITING THE DUCT INTERFACE INTO THE TEST BAY DOES NOT APPEAR TO PRESENT A SAFETY ISSUE FOR CF3I, HFC-125, AND FK 5-1-12



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


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FAA Technical Center Atlantic City Int'l Airport, NJ USA (04c15-10, HFC-125, HiVent OIL SPRAY)

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FLAME ATTACHMENT BEHAVIORS

FLAME ATTACHMENT, INTRODUCTION

→ MARCH - JULY 2006, FK 5-1-12

- DURING THE MAJORITY OF TESTING, FIRE WAS OBSERVED TO EXIST IN THE FIXTURE DURING THE REIGNITION TIME DELAY (RTD)
- ♦ FIRE WAS TYPICALLY INDICATED BY REFLECTION
- ♦ FIRE ALSO OBSERVED DIRECTLY DURING THE RTD
- POOL FIRE WORK PRODUCED THE MOST READILY OBSERVED FIRE DURING THE RTD

→ AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2005, CF3I

- DURING THE MAJORITY OF TESTING, FIRE IS OBSERVED TO EXIST IN THE FIXTURE DURING THE RTD
- ♦ DURING HIGH VENTILATION POOL FIRE,
 - ✦ FLAME ATTACHMENT AT DOWNSTREAM LIP OF THE FUEL PAN COULD NOT BE ELIMINATED WITH 8 LBM OF AGENT
 - ✦ MASS EQUIVALENCE ESTABLISHED WITH 2-4 LBM


→ WHY A CONCERN ?

- ♦ NOT EQUIVALENT TO H1301
- ♦ THE FIRE IS NOT FULLY SUPPRESSED


→ PHOTODIODE BEHAVIORS ILLUSTRATE THE ISSUE

- PHOTODIODE BEHAVIORS ONLY VALUABLE IN SPRAY FIRE WORK (THEY LOOK AT 12:00 ALONG FIXTURE LENGTH)
- CALCULATED AN AVERAGE OF 4 CHANNELS FOR A DURATION OF TIME (8 OR 11 SECONDS) AT 3 PLACES IN THE TEST TIMELINE
- ♦ 3 PLACES IN THE TIMELINE DURING : (1) NON-FIRE BASELINE, (2) FIRE IN PREBURN, AND (3) SURROUNDING THE RTD
- ♦ COMPARED H1301 AND FK 5-1-12 BEHAVIORS

FLAME ATTACHM ENT – PHOTODIODE BEHAVIOR




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


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
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FLAME ATTACHM ENT – PHOTODIODE BEHAVIOR






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
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FLAME ATTACHM ENT – PHOTODIODE BEHAVIOR



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- → NON-FIRE BASELINES REASONABLY REPEATABLE
- → FIRE BEHAVIOR (NON-RTD DURATION) REASONABLY REPEATABLE
- → FK 5-1-12 AND H1301 FIRE SUPPRESSION BEHAVIORS ARE CLEARLY DIFFERENT
- → FK-5-1-12 FLAME ATTACHMENT BEHAVIOR IS INDEPENDENT FROM RTD; CF3I BEHAVIOR ASSUMED TO BE SIMILAR
- → HIGH VENTILATION FOR THE 4.0 KG FK 5-1-12 MASS
 - ◆ 2 NOZZLE INJECTION BEHAVIOR :
 - ✤ 40-50% INCREASE IN PHOTODIODE ACTIVITY ABOVE H1301
 - ✦ NEGLIGIBLE CHANGE IN RTD
 - ♦ 4 NOZZLE INJECTION BEHAVIOR (".../4" REFERENCES IN GRAPH)
 - ★ 30% INCREASE IN PHOTODIODE ACTVITITY ABOVE H1301
 - ✤ INCREASED RTD ABOVE H1301 BY 25%

→ LOW VENTILATION INDICATES NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHOTODIODE ACTIVITY AND RTD

- → STANDARD DEVIATIONS DURING THE FIRE HISTORIES CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE ISSUE ADDITIONALLY
 - "LARGE" DEVIATION = "GOOD"; SOME PHOTODIODES SEE NO OR MINIMAL FIRE YET OTHERS SEE FIRE
- → AGENT IS TRANSPORTING 5-8 FEET PRIOR TO INTERACTING WITH FIRE

→ CF3I (-9°F) & FK 5-1-12 (120°F) NORMAL BOILING POINTS > H1301 (-72°F)

→ CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING, THE DISTRIBUTION PLUMBING OF THESE AGENTS WOULD BE A LOGICAL EXPLANATION FOR THE FLAME ATTACHMENT PROBLEMS

- ♦ TRANSPORT DISTANCE IN THE FIXTURE
- ♦ DIFFERENCE IN NORMAL BOILING POINTS (H1301, CF3I, FK 5-1-12)
- ♦ THE NON-OPTIMIZED INJECTION PLUMBING (CF31, FK 5-1-12)
- → HOWEVER, TESTING HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED TO VERIFY THE PRECEDING OPINION. OTHER POSSIBILITIES TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM MAY LIE WITH :
 - INCREASING THE AGENT CONCENTRATION ABOVE THE EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATION
 - INCREASING THE AGENT DWELL TIME (SOMETHING LARGER THAN 0.5 SECOND; i.e. UK MoD H1211 specification)
 - ♦ BOTH

CONCLUSIONS

- → THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TEST FIXTURE HAS BEEN REASONABLE; WORK RESULTING IS RELIABLE
- → INSTABILITY IS OBSERVED AND RELATED TO :
 - "HIGH" BOILING POINT AGENTS THAT REQUIRED "LARGE" MASSES TO MEET MASS EQUIVALENCE
 - THE QUIESCENT FLOW REGIME OF LOW VENTILATION
- → THE LARGEST EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATIONS COMPARE REASONABLY WITH REPORTED DESIGN CONCENTRATIONS
- → THE REPLACEMENT CANDIDATES EACH EXHIBITED SOME OVER-PRESSURE BEHAVIOR AT THE DUCT INTERFACE; GIVEN THE PRESSURES INVOLVED MOVED SMOKE ALONE AND DEMONSTRATED NO FIRE EVOLUTION, THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE A SAFETY ISSUE REMAINS
- → FLAME ATTACHMENT ATYPICAL OF H1301 WAS OBSERVED DURING TESTING WITH CF3I & FK 5-1-12
 - THE AGENT DISTRIBUTION PLUMBING <u>MAY</u> BE THE EXPLANATION
 - FURTHER TESTING IS ADVISED TO REFUTE OR ACCEPT THE LARGEST EQUIVALENT CONCENTRATION FOR EACH