Jack H. Cohen

Tests were conducted to investigate the degree of hazard resulting from fuel entering aircraft turbojet engines with the engine primary-air supply. The J35-A-13D and J47-GE-25 series engines were used for the tests. During engine operation, measured quantities of JP-4 fuel were released and carried by engine primary air into the engine compressor. Each engine failed when the quantity of ingested fuel approached approximately 1 per cent by weight of the normal quantity of engine primary air with actual failures occurring between 0.8 and 1.1 per cent. However, each engine failed in a different manner; the J35 engine failed as a result of components becoming overheated and the J47 engine failed as the result of a compressor stall.

G.W. Birdsall

This book explains the principles and procedures for heat treating the aluminum alloys. You do not need to be a metallurgist to understand the simple concepts used to provide the reader with a clear picture of what happens when aluminum is heat treated.

Paul R. Dierdorf & James E. Demaree

As a result of request by Region 3 of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Kansas City, Missouri, a modified PBY aircraft, designation N19Q, was flown to the Technical Development Center, Indianapolis, Indiana, on August 19, 1957, for evaluation tests of the fire extinguishing system. Two flight tests were conducted, one under takeoff power and the other under cruise power conditions. Extinguishing agent concentrations were measured by means of the Statham Model GA-2A portable gas analyzer. This instrument is capable of recording the concentrations and duration of the discharge of the extinguishing agent while the aircraft is in flight. A recorded agent concentration of at least 15 per cent, for duration of ½ second or longer, is required to assure that the extinguishing system is adequate.

Paul R. Dierdorf

The occurrence of a spontaneous-combustion fire in an aircraft oxygen system indicated a need for investigating this hazard. Accordingly, tests were conducted in an attempt to reproduce this accident. These were followed by tests in which combustibles were ignited. Spontaneous combustion did not occur in the first series of tests. In subsequent tests, however, and while a fire was burning at the outlet manifold, spontaneous combustion did occur in the line leading from oxygen cylinder to the outlet manifold. This was attributed to oil contamination in the lines. Ignited fires damaged neoprene valves seats and caused an explosion in the manifold. It is recommended that care be taken to avid contamination of the system, that nonflammable materials to be used, and that rate-of-flow control valves be incorporated to prevent a surge of oxygen in case of manifold failure.

Paul R. Dierdorf

The occurrence of a spontaneous-combustion fire in an aircraft oxygen system indicated a need for investigating this hazard. Accordingly, tests were conducted in an attempt to reproduce this accident. These were followed by tests in which combustibles were ignited. Spontaneous combustion did not occur in the first series of tests. In subsequent tests, however, and while a fire was burning at the outlet manifold, spontaneous combustion did occur in the line leading from oxygen cylinder to the outlet manifold. This was attributed to oil contamination in the lines. Ignited fires damaged neoprene valves seats and caused an explosion in the manifold. It is recommended that care be taken to avid contamination of the system, that nonflammable materials to be used, and that rate-of-flow control valves be incorporated to prevent a surge of oxygen in case of manifold failure.